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New Product Diffusion with Two Interacting Segments or Products  
 
Abstract 
We study the diffusion of a product in two customer segments where the acceptance level in one 
segment affects the diffusion rate not only in that same segment, but also in the other. The inter-segment 
influence can be positive or negative, i.e., the acceptance level of the product in one segment can 
reinforce or impede its diffusion in the other. The model set-up also applies to the diffusion of two 
products, with independent market potential, in a single population. Since the diffusion system we study 
does not have a closed-form solution, we use phase plane analysis to identify the equilibrium points of the 
joint diffusion process and to characterize their stability properties. Further, we provide a means to 
identify the regions with different convergence behavior, i.e., to identify boundaries for regions within 
which all trajectories converge to a particular equilibrium point. For the cases of asymmetric influence 
(+/-) and mutually impeding influence (-/-), we also provide conditions under which both products can 
achieve full market potential in equilibrium. Finally, we provide managerial insights into the effectiveness 
of two strategies in the context of asymmetric (+/-) interaction between two customer segments: (1) 
“seeding,” i.e., using free samples to support the launch of a product in one segment being harmed by the 
adoption in the other, and (2) “demand control,” i.e., purposely limiting market potential for the customer 
segment harming product diffusion in the other segment. 
 
Key words: diffusion of innovations; innovation; marketing strategy; new product research; social 
contagion; word-of-mouth. 
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1. Introduction 
Product diffusion with a group of customers rarely occurs in isolation and is often influenced by the 
presence of other products or customer groups in the market. Multiproduct interactions go well beyond 
the standard argument that innovation diffusion is a substitution process from an old to a new technology, 
product or practice, and include a vast set of competitive, complementary, and asymmetric interactions 
among jointly diffusing innovations (Bayus, Kim and Shocker 2000). Examples of the joint diffusion of 
competing products are rife: gas vs. electric stove in kitchen appliances, desktop vs. laptop PCs in the 
computer industry, DSL vs. cable broadband in the telecommunications industry, and so on. Of particular 
interest, in the last ten years or so, have been cases where both competing products benefit from installed 
base effects or direct network effects, resulting in “get big first” races. More recently, indirect network 
effects such as those in the diffusion of complementary hardware and software have received considerable 
attention (e.g., Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Stremersch et al. 2007). 
Examples of the joint diffusion of complementary products include that of microwave ovens and 
microwave-ready meals, that of clothes washers and dryers (Peterson and Mahajan 1978), that of legal 
and pirated software (Givon, Mahajan and Muller 1995; Nascimento and Vanhonacker 1988), and that of 
retail scanners and UPC barcodes (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993). Multiproduct interactions are not limited 
to only mutually impeding (-/-), as with substitutes, or mutually facilitating or symbiotic (+/+), as with 
complements. Various types of asymmetric interactions are possible as well, including “predator-prey” 
(+/-) and facilitating or “commensalistic” (+/0) interactions (Bauer and Castillo-Chávez 2001; Bayus et 
al. 2000).  
Interactions among diffusion processes are of interest not only in settings involving multiple products 
diffusing in one and the same population, but also in settings involving a single product diffusing in 
multiple sets of customer that interact with each other. The latter may involve the diffusion across 
multiple countries, states, or other geographical areas (e.g., Kumar and Krishnan 2002; Putsis et al. 1997) 
or the diffusion of a single product in multiple, interacting market segments (e.g., Berger and Heath 2007; 
Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo 2006; Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007). This last type of interacting diffusion 
processes has received considerable research attention lately, as it pertains to phenomena of great 
theoretical and managerial interest. These include not only opinion leader-follower dynamics and 
competition for status (e.g., Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007; Watts and Dodds 2007), but also social 
identity dynamics between segments that present important challenges to the development of brands with 
strong iconic content, including Burberry, Diesel Jeans, Porsche, Red Bull, Vans, and Tommy Hilfiger 
(e.g., Grigorian and Chandon 2004; Kumar, Linguri and Tavassoli 2005; Moon and Kiron 2002; Moon et 
al. 2003). Managing the growth of such brands has proven particularly tricky as it features asymmetric 
“predator-prey” (+/-) influences among segments. These brands first become popular among one set of 
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customers. That success in the original core segment subsequently spills over to other customers who use 
the latter as reference or aspiration group. The success among such “wannabes,” however, detracts from 
the appeal of the brand among the “originals” and may ultimately lead all of them to drop the brand and 
chose another, less “overexposed” and still “authentic,” iconic brand to signify their identity (e.g., Berger 
and Heath 2008; Clunas 2004; Thornton 1996). As aspirants imitate originals who seek to protect their 
distinctiveness, the latter disadopt the products, brands, and cultural practices they helped make popular 
in the first place (Bourdieu 1984; Simmel 1971). Mutually impeding (-/-) influences have also long been 
documented among sub-cultures, the classic example being the rivalry between “mods” and “rockers” 
affecting the diffusion of the Vespa and other scooters in Great Britain in the 1960s (Hebdige 1979; 
1988). When new products and brands diffuse in markets characterized by the existence of multiple sub-
cultures (e.g., “geeks,” “jocks” and “Goths” in US high schools) and these products or brands get picked 
as social signifiers, then their market acceptance becomes very hard to predict.  
Given their importance in the success and downfall of iconic brands and identity-related products and 
their importance in cultural dynamics more generally, negative cross-segment effects have become a topic 
of considerable interest to consumer researchers interested in social identity issues (Berger and Heath 
2007, 2008; Berger and Rand 2008; Escalas and Bettman 2005; White and Dahl 2006, 2007). The issue 
has also become the subject of analytic modeling in marketing. Amaldoss and Jain (2005a, 2005b) 
examine how desires for uniqueness and conformism affect firm strategy. Their one-period game-
theoretic framework, however, does not examine diffusion trajectories, and considers consumers who 
wish to be different from all other consumers or wish to be similar to all other consumers rather than 
group-specific attraction and repulsion. In more recent work, Amaldoss and Jain (2008) explicitly study 
asymmetric (+/-) effects between reference groups, but focus on identifying optimal price and product 
strategy in a two-period game-theoretic setting rather than on characterizing diffusion trajectories over 
time. Joshi, Reibstein and Zhang (2006) analyze the optimal timing of entry in two segments with 
asymmetric (+/-) contagion effects between them. They study the issue both in a two-period and in a 
continuous-time set-up, and can determine the optimal entry time for the latter only numerically. Hence, 
while the question how negative cross-segment interaction affects new product acceptance has emerged 
as a topic of great interest to both managers and researchers, recent research offers only limited analytic 
modeling insights about diffusion trajectories in settings with negative cross-segment effects.  
Theoretical progress in the area of new product diffusion featuring multiproduct or multisegment 
interactions has been hampered by the difficulty to develop closed-form solutions. Modeling efforts have 
eschewed formal analytics in favor of numerical analysis (e.g., Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo 2006), 
addressed only one-way influence between influentials and followers (Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007), or 
have had to make other restrictive assumptions on the nature of the inter-product or inter-market 
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interactions in order to derive closed-form solutions (Kumar and Krishnan 2002; Peterson and Mahajan 
1978). Fortunately, managerially useful analytical understanding of a multiproduct or multisegment 
diffusion process can be gained even when closed-form solutions for the full diffusion curve do not exist. 
Consider the example of a new prestige product like the iPhone diffusing across two interacting 
population segments, the “originals” and the “wannabes,” who exert an asymmetric influence on each 
other, as discussed earlier. The marketer would be interested in determining the possible equilibrium 
outcomes of the diffusion process based on current installed base and the nature of inter-segment 
interaction. For instance, will the “originals” stay with the product or will they start disadopting once the 
product becomes popular among wannbees? In the latter case, how many of the originals will be using the 
product in equilibrium? Is it possible to end up in a situation where none of the originals use the product 
yet all wannabes do? To detect possible problems early on, the marketer would also like to know which 
levels of acceptance in both segments are likely to lead to complete acceptance by both segments and 
which levels pose the risk of evolving into a situation where the full market potential is not reached. Other 
issues of interest include identifying whether and how strategies such as providing free samples to jump-
start the diffusion in the impeded segment of originals or limiting the market potential in the impeding 
segment of wannabes can influence the equilibrium outcomes and overall profits of the firm. So, even 
when closed-form solutions to the co-diffusion process cannot be derived, an analytical characterization 
of the possible equilibrium outcomes and their stability properties can be quite useful if they allow a 
manager to determine whether or not some type of intervention is required. Once this is known, optimal 
policies such as the level of sampling can be determined numerically.  
We study the diffusion system of two interacting products or segments; and apply phase plane 
analysis to a model specification that was proposed by Peterson and Mahajan (1978), Nascimento and 
Vanhonacker (1993), Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) and Geroski (2000), and that nests the model 
specification studied recently by Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007). In the model we work with, each 
product or segment has its own independent market potential, and the user base of a product or segment 
affects the diffusion rate of not only itself, but also the other product or segment. The latter effect may be 
either positive or negative. Specifically, the model consists of two interlinked differential equations: 
 ))(( 11211111 NmNcNbadt
dN −++=  (1a) 
 ))(( 22122222 NmNcNbadt
dN −++= , (1b) 
where the subscript i refers to one of two segments or products, and  ai > 0, bi > 0, mi > 0, 0 ≤ Ni ≤ mi. 
Table 1 summarizes the notation, using the terminology for two segments rather than two products.  
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Table 1. Glossary of Terms 
Ni number of users in segment i at time t (shorthand for Ni(t)) 
mi market potential for segment i 
ai coefficient of innovation for segment i 
bi coefficient of imitation or contagion for segment i 
ci coefficient of inter-segment interaction (contagion effect from segment j on 
segment i) 
 
The c parameters capture the interaction between the two segments and can be positive, zero, or 
negative. We assume that the rate )( jiiii NcNba ++ can be negative, i.e., that the product can be 
disadopted. However, the constraints 01 ≥N and 02 ≥N  ensure that disadoptions cannot reduce the 
number of current users to less than zero. Allowing for disadoption is a feature that is absent from most 
diffusion models but that is important to appropriately representing the full consequences of negative 
cross-segment effects (Berger and Heath 2008). The system of equations does not explicitly model the 
impact of disadoptions in a segment on the rate of diffusion in the same segment beyond the effect of 
having a lower user base. This is because, in our setting, the reason for disadoption in segment i is the 
negative influence exerted by segment j (when ci is strictly negative) rather than any negative word of 
mouth within segment i. Our model captures the antecedent detrimental cross-segment effect but ignores 
any additional mediating effect of negative within-segment word-of-mouth. Since this system of 
simultaneous differential equations does not have a closed-form solution when both cross-effects are at 
work (Peterson and Mahajan 1978), we investigate the equilibrium values and trajectories of N1 and N2 by 
phase plane analysis. 
Our research makes three contributions. First, we analytically determine equilibrium points of the 
joint diffusion process and characterize their stability properties. We find that irrespective of the nature 
(positive or negative) of inter-segment interaction in a two-segment diffusion model, the stable 
equilibrium outcomes belong to the set { )0,(),,0( 12 mm , ),( 21 mm }, where m1 and m2 are the market 
potential for segments 1 and 2 respectively. Candidate equilibrium outcomes with intermediate values of 
market penetration do arise, but are always found to be unstable.  
Second, we show how to clearly demarcate regions within which all trajectories converge to a 
particular equilibrium point, which in turn can be used to identify the need for early managerial 
interventions. The boundaries of these regions are referred to as separatrices. We also point the readers to 
a computational approach to plot the separatrices. An important implication of identifying the separatrix 
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is that, in the region in the vicinity of the separatrix, small shifts in the installed base can lead to 
dramatically different equilibrium outcomes of the diffusion process. 
Finally, we illustrate the insight-generating potential of this methodology by assessing the 
effectiveness of two strategies in the context of asymmetric (+/-) interaction between customer segments: 
(1) “seeding,” i.e., using free samples to support the launch of a product in a customer segment that is 
being harmed by product adoption in another customer segment, and (2) “demand control,” i.e., purposely 
limiting product distribution in the customer segment that is harming the diffusion of the product in the 
other segment. The analyses reveal several counter-intuitive results and demonstrate that ignoring joint 
diffusion in environments with strong inter-segment interactions can generate incorrect policy 
recommendations. For example, while prior research has revealed that the optimal sampling level is non-
decreasing with the coefficient of imitation, we find that the optimal sampling level is decreasing in the 
coefficient of imitation when there is a strong impeding influence from the other segment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of our research strategy 
which is mainly centered on the use of phase plane analysis. Section 3 deals with the Asymmetric 
Influence (+/-) Model, and includes an illustrative discussion of managerial implications in this setting 
which is of particular interest to marketers of products with strong status or social identity value. Section 
4 describes the Mutually Impeding (-/-) Model; and Section 5 deals with the Symbiotic Influence (+/+) 
Model. Finally, Section 6 discusses our main results and their implications. 
 
2. Research Strategy 
Since the model does not have a closed-form solution when both cross-effects are at work, we study 
its behavior by identifying the possible equilibrium outcomes and trajectories of N1 and N2. We do so 
using phase plane analysis. The key tool in such analysis is the phase diagram, which is the path of 
diffusion process in the (t, N1, N2) space projected onto the N1-N2 plane. In other words, it plots N1(t) 
versus N2(t) and is what one would see if one stood high on the time axis and looked down upon on the 
N1-N2 plane, sometimes referred to as the phase plane (Hubbard and West 1995).  Such phase diagrams 
provide a convenient visual tool for studying the properties of a dynamical system. We adopt the 
convention (without loss of generality) that N1 is measured along the horizontal axis and N2 on the vertical 
axis of the phase diagram. Other papers in marketing that have used phase diagrams include Heiman et al. 
(2001) and Muller (1983). 
We illustrate the technique of phase plane analysis by applying it to the system of equations described 
in (1a) and (1b), subject to the conditions c1 < 0, c2 ≥ 0. The properties of the same system are analyzed 
and interpreted more comprehensively in Section 3.1. There are five main steps in the phase plane 
analysis (Hubbard and West 1995), as required for our purposes: 
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1. Identify the isoclines, i.e., the curves in the phase plane representing points at which 
0'1
1 ==N
dt
dN
 or 0'22 == Ndt
dN
. The isoclines for N1 are identified by the condition 
0'1 =N . Substituting this into equations (1a) and (1b), we get 
       11 mN =           (2) 
                  and 
      0)( 21111 =++ NcNba         (3) 
                  Since c1 < 0, equation (3) can be rewritten as 
       ||/)( 11112 cNbaN +=         (4) 
                  The isoclines for N2 are identified by the condition 02 =′N . Since c2 ≥ 0, the only isocline 
satisfying the required condition is 22 mN = . 
2. Sketch the trajectories to visually illustrate the behavior of the dynamical system. Any point 
on the isoclines represented by equations (2) and (4) cannot undergo a change in 1N  
(since 0'1 =N ). Thus, from any point on those isoclines, the 21NN trajectory must either 
remain at that point (if 0'2 =N ), move up (if 0'2 >N ), or move down (if 0'2 <N ) in the 
phase plane. Further, since 02 ≥c , it follows that 0'2 >N , for all 22 mN < . Thus, from any 
point on the isoclines represented by (2) and (4), the 21NN  trajectory must move upwards as 
long as 22 mN < , as shown in Figure 1. Points on the isocline 0'2 =N  can only move to the 
right or to the left, depending on whether 01 >′N  or 01 <′N  respectively. 
3. Identify the singular points, i.e., the points where the isoclines 0'1 =N  and 0'2 =N  cross each 
other. Such points are of special interest as they may, but need not, be stable equilibrium 
outcomes of the diffusion process. The two singular points in our system are ( 21 , mm ) 
and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,)||( m
b
acm
. The latter can lie within the feasible region, or outside. For the 
purposes of this illustrative discussion, we focus our attention on the case in which the point 
lies within the feasible region ( 1
1
112 )||(0 m
b
acm <−< ). In Section 3.1 we consider both 
cases. The two singular points are represented as points A and B respectively in Figure 1. 
Even though the boundary points (0,m2) and (m1,0) are not singular points as they do not lie at 
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the intersection of isoclines, they can nevertheless be candidate equilibrium outcomes due to 
the impact of the constraints 11 mN ≤  and 22 mN ≤ . 
4. Formally characterize the stability properties of the relevant singular and boundary points. 
One achieves this by slightly perturbing the system in the neighborhood of the point of 
interest, and then checking the sign of the derivatives 1N
′  and 2N ′  to determine if the system 
returns to the same point (stable), or not (unstable). For the cases dealt with in this paper, a 
singular point is either a stable sink or an unstable saddle point. Sinks are stable singular 
points into which infinitely many trajectories converge. A sink represents a stable equilibrium 
because a small perturbation will cause the system to return to the same equilibrium. Saddle 
points, in contrast, are unstable singular points into which precisely two trajectories will 
converge. A saddle point represents an unstable equilibrium because a small perturbation can 
change the resulting equilibrium. In Section 3.1 we show rigorously that ( 21 , mm ) is stable 
while ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,
)||( m
b
acm
is unstable. The boundary point (0,m2) is a stable equilibrium 
outcome also.  
5. Finally, the phase plane is segmented into regions within which all trajectories converge to 
the same stable equilibrium outcome. We provide an algorithm to plot the boundary between 
any two such adjacent regions (also known as the separatrix) in Appendix C. The following 
is a heuristic explanation for the observed convergence behavior. Consider the 
isocline ||/)( 11112 cNbaN += . Points on this line have 01 =′N . We know that 02 >′N  
for all 22 mN < . Thus, from points on this line, the 21NN  curve will move vertically 
upwards as shown by the arrows in Figure 1. Points to the left of this isocline have 01 <′N  
and 02 >′N  (see step 2) and thus the 21NN  curve passing through points in this region will 
move left and upwards as shown by the arrows. Thus, if we start at any point in this region, 
then 1N  will keep decreasing and 2N  increasing until we reach the boundary ),0( 2m . Thus, 
all trajectories passing through points to the left of the isocline ||/)( 11112 cNbaN +=  or on 
the isocline itself, will eventually converge to ),0( 2m . For points to the right of the isocline 
we have 01 >′N  and 02 >′N . Thus, the trajectory will move right and upwards as shown 
by the arrows. Points that are close to point A will converge to ),( 21 mm . However, that 
cannot be said of all points to the right of the isocline because a trajectory can potentially 
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cross the isocline. The curve which separates the trajectories into two regions, depending on 
the final equilibrium outcome, is the separatrix (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Phase Diagram 
 
We now introduce some terminology which is helpful in classifying the different types of inter-
segment interaction that we will be studying in this paper. We define the concept of a limiting hazard rate 
(LHRi) for product i, where i,j }2,1{∈  and i≠ j: 
)(lim
)(
1lim jiiii
mN
mN
i
iimN
mNi
NcNba
dt
dN
Nm
LHR
jj
ii
jj
ii
++=−= →→→→  
LHRi is the hazard rate of the diffusion process at the upper extreme of the feasible region, i.e., (Ni, 
Nj)→ (mi, mj). In the limit (Ni, Nj)→ (mi, mj), a negative value for LHRi is indicative of a very strong 
negative influence of segment j on segment i, while a positive LHRi is indicative of a mild negative 
influence of segment j. In all future reference to LHRi, it is implied that the term is defined in the limit.   
Table 2 provides definitions of the main analytical concepts used in this paper. 
 
 
SEPARATRIX
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Table 2. Definitions of Technical Terms 
Technical Term Definition 
Phase Diagram For a mathematical system which describes how two variables N1(t) and N2(t) evolve 
with time, the phase diagram is the solution in the (t, N1, N2) space projected onto the N1-
N2 plane. The plot is what one would see if one stood high on the time axis and looked 
down upon on the N1-N2 plane. 
Isoclines For a mathematical systems evolving with time, isoclines are curves representing points 
at which 0=
dt
dNi , or the time rate of change of variable Ni is 0. 
Singular Points Points at which the time rate of change of all variables in a mathematical system is equal 
to 0. 
Sinks Stable singular points into which infinitely many trajectories converge. A sink represents 
a stable equilibrium because a small perturbation will once again result in the same 
equilibrium outcome. 
Saddle Points Unstable singular points into which precisely two trajectories converge. A saddle point 
represents an unstable equilibrium because a small perturbation can change the resulting 
equilibrium. 
Separatrices Boundaries for regions in the phase plane that display different convergence behavior, 
i.e., regions within which all trajectories converge to a particular singular point. 
Limiting Hazard 
Rate 
For the system of differential equations in R2, as described in (1a) & (1b), the limiting 
hazard rate is the rate of decrease (percentage) in the population yet to adopt product i, at 
the upper extreme of the feasible region, i.e.,(Ni, Nj)→ (mi, mj). 
 
In the next three sections, we present phase plane analyses of the following three cases: Asymmetric 
influence ( 0,0 21 ≥< cc ), Mutually impeding influence ( 0,0 21 << cc ), and Symbiotic influence 
( 0,0 21 ≥≥ cc ). A special case of symbiotic (one-way) influence (c1 = 0, c2 > 0) for which closed-form 
solutions do exist, has been analyzed recently by Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007). 
 
3. Asymmetric Influence Model (+ / -) 
We first consider an asymmetric influence model in which the success in segment 1 fosters the 
diffusion in segment 2, but success in segment 2 adversely affects the diffusion in segment 1 
( 0,0 21 ≥< cc ). The case with 0,0 21 <≥ cc  is analogous in its treatment. These cases correspond to 
the situation faced by many brands with high status or reference group appeal, like Burberry, Red Bull 
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and Vans. Another instance, in which product form and segment status are intertwined, is that of the 
interactions between Porsche sports cars bought by driving enthusiasts and Porsche SUVs bought by 
more mainstream drivers, including soccer moms. While the SUV sales in all likelihood benefited from 
the success of the Porsche 911 and 959 as high performance cars, the latter’s drivers were frustrated by 
seeing soccer moms on the road in Porsche Cayenne SUVs (Joshi, Reibstein and Zhang 2007). We 
analyze the various equilibrium outcomes that might be attained under such cross-segment dynamics, and 
identify conditions under which both segments can achieve their full market potential.  
The two singular points for our system, identified by determining the points of intersection of the 
isoclines (as represented by (2), (4), and 22 mN = ) , are ( 21 , mm ) and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,
)||( m
b
acm
. When 
LHR1 is positive (i.e., 1 1 1 1 2a b m c m+ + > 0, which corresponds to mild negative influence of segment 2 on 
segment 1) then 2 1 1 1
1
( | | )m c a m
b
− <  and thus the singular point ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,)||( m
b
acm
 lies within the 
feasible region. Conversely, when LHR1 is negative (which corresponds to strong negative influence of 
segment 2 on segment 1), the point lies outside the feasible region. Accordingly, we consider two cases 
below.  
 
3.1.  Mild Negative Influence (Positive LHR1) 
When 1
1
112 )||(0 m
b
acm <−<  (i.e., mild negative influence of segment 2 on 1, or positive LHR1), there 
are two singular points within the feasible region. These are labeled A and B in Figure 1. In addition, 
),0( 2m  is a boundary point of interest. 
As described in Section 2, ( 21 , mm ) is a sink or a stable equilibrium and the other singular point  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,
)||( m
b
acm
 is a saddle point. Therefore, the system has only two long-term stable outcomes, 
namely ),0( 2m  and ( 21 , mm ). This result is formally stated in Proposition 1.  
Proposition 1: For the Asymmetric Influence model with a positive value for LHR1, the only stable 
equilibrium outcomes possible are ),0( 2m  and ( 21 , mm ). 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Proposition 1 states that all trajectories in the phase plane converge to either ),0( 2m  or ( 21 , mm ). 
Given the two equilibrium outcomes, it is additionally possible to separate the phase plane into two 
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regions, one within which all trajectories converge to ),0( 2m  and another within which all trajectories 
converge to ( 21 , mm ).  
A powerful result to this end is that the trajectories that converge to the saddle point, the so-called 
separatrices, separate the phase plane into regions demonstrating different convergence behavior 
(Hubbard and West 1995). These separatrices can be computed numerically for any system as described 
in detail in Appendix C. A spreadsheet implementation of the algorithm for computation of the Separatrix 
for the scenario described in this section is also available.. 
Figure 2 shows a plot of the phase diagram with the separatrix and several sample trajectories for the 
following system: 
1000
1000
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       (5) 
Figure 2. Phase Diagram with Separatrix for the diffusion system in (5) 
 
The order of magnitude of the parameters in (5) is consistent with prior research (e.g., Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993; Joshi et al. 2006; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). 
SEPARATRIX
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The trajectories to the left of the separatrix lie in a region where the relative size of the installed base 
in segment 2 to that in segment 1 is such that the negative influence exerted by segment 2 is dominant in 
segment 1’s diffusion rate. As a result, the users in segment 1 will eventually disadopt, leading to a final 
equilibrium outcome ),0( 2m . 
The identification of the stable equilibrium outcomes and the separatrix can together answer several 
questions. For example, starting from (0,0), can the system converge to ( 21 , mm )? For the system in (5), 
this is clearly impossible. However, distributing free samples of the product in segment 1 can help jump-
start the diffusion from an initial point to the right of the separatrix. How many free samples are needed to 
change the long-term equilibrium? This can also be determined for a system with known diffusion 
parameters. We discuss some of these managerial implications in greater detail in Section 3.3. However, 
before doing so, we first proceed to analyze the second case for the Asymmetric Influence model, where 
1
1
112 )||( m
b
acm >− . ( The degenerate case in which 1
1
112 )||( m
b
acm =−  leads to a line of unstable 
equilibria.) 
 
3.2 Strong Negative Influence (Negative LHR1 ) 
When 1
1
112 )||( m
b
acm >− (i.e., strong negative influence of segment 2 on 1, or negative LHR1), the 
singular point ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,
)||( m
b
acm
 is outside the feasible region and thus, is not of interest. The only 
singular point in the feasible region is ( 21 , mm ). A small perturbation of the system around the singular 
point ( 21 , mm ) will result in a negative value for dtdN /1  (by virtue of negative LHR1), and thus the 
trajectory will not return to ( 21 , mm ). This suggests that the singular point ( 21 , mm ) may not be a stable 
equilibrium point.  
The phase diagram for this case can be constructed following the steps described in Section 2, and is 
shown in Figure 3. Since 02 >′N  for all 22 mN < , a trajectory starting from any point in the feasible 
region will eventually be above the isocline ||/)( 11112 cNbaN += . Once the trajectory is above the 
isocline, we have 01 <′N . Thus, 1N  will decrease until it reaches zero. The only possible long-term 
outcome is ( 2,0 m ). In the long-term, segment 1 consumers will disadopt completely. This is stated 
formally in our next result. 
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Figure 3: Phase diagram for Strong Negative Influence (Asymmetric Interaction) 
 
Proposition 2: For the Asymmetric Influence model with a negative value for LHR1, the only stable 
equilibrium outcome possible is ),0( 2m . 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Using the technique described above, a manager can determine early on, whether or not the product 
will diffuse to its market potential in both consumer segments. If the diffusion parameters result in a 
phase diagram as in Figure 3, the full-diffusion outcome ( 21 , mm ) will never materialize. If, in contrast, 
the situation is as in Figure 2, full diffusion is possible but not guaranteed. For example, a process that 
starts at (10,0) will achieve full diffusion but one that starts at (0,0) will not. So, phase plane analysis can 
determine whether or not some intervention, such as seeding the process using free samples, will be 
necessary to achieve full diffusion. Phase plane analysis may also avoid managers becoming lulled in a 
false sense of complacency. Consider the diffusion path of the product as captured in Figure 3. For a 
trajectory in the region below the isocline (where 01 >′N ), diffusion in segment 1 may seem to be 
proceeding quite smoothly early on, but will reverse once adoption in segment 2 is sufficiently high. 
Thus, initial diffusion data can mislead managers into believing that the product adoption will continue in 
a smooth manner. Under such circumstances, managers and analysts may need to explore other options, 
such as reducing the impeding contagion effect ( 1c ) from segment 2 by launching different product 
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variants or brands in the two segments or restricting the potential market size of segment 2. We 
investigate and assess some managerial interventions next. 
 
3.3.  Managerial Implications for the Asymmetric Influence case 
In this section we illustrate the ability of phase plane analysis to generate managerial insights, by 
studying the following two strategies: (1) “seeding,” i.e., using free samples to support the launch of a 
product in a consumer segment being harmed by the adoption in another consumer segment, and (2) 
“demand control,” i.e., purposely limiting market potential for the customer segment harming product 
diffusion in the other segment.  
 
3.3.1. Optimal Seeding 
The phase diagram in Figure 1 shows that a diffusion process starting with zero initial penetration in 
both segments will naturally evolve to an equilibrium in which segment 2 reaches full penetration but 
segment 1 has no adopters. However, if the process were to start to the right side of the separatrix, full 
penetration would be achieved in both segments. One way to achieve this outcome is for the marketer to 
seed segment 1 with enough samples at launch. 
Product sampling is usually recommended when product benefits cannot be fully conveyed by 
advertising, the product has new features that need to be appreciated to overcome adoption risks, or when 
WOM effects play a critical role in product diffusion. Jain, Mahajan and Muller (1995) have investigated 
the optimal sampling level to offer in a single product, single segment setting and found that optimal 
sampling levels are high for products with a low coefficient of innovation, or a high coefficient of 
imitation. Lehman and Esteban-Bravo (2006) investigated a setting with one-way (+/0) influence, and 
found that the optimal sampling level in the affected segment decreases as its coefficient of innovation 
increases but first decreases and then increases as its coefficient of imitation increases. We extend these 
analyses by investigating the problem of optimal sampling for a two-segment diffusion model with 
asymmetric negative (-/0) interaction between the segments.  
The firm chooses the optimal number of free samples for consumers in segment 1 (whose diffusion is 
impeded by adoption in segment 2), in order to maximize its total discounted profit. The decision problem 
is: 
)()/()()/()(maxmax 112
1
22
1
1
1
11
1
11
S
t
t
t
t
NN
NsdtdtdNupdtdtdNup
SS
−−+−= ∑∑ ∞
=
−∞
=
− δδπ        (6) 
where SN1  is the number of free samples of product offered in segment 1, ip  is the price charged to 
segment i, iu  is the unit cost of manufacturing the product, δ is a discount factor, and s1 is the unit cost of 
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offering a free sample of the product to segment 1. Note that the above formulation is the same as in Jain, 
Mahajan and Muller (1995), with the exception that there are two consumer segments in our formulation. 
We investigate the solution numerically using parameters within the same range as those used in Jain, 
Mahajan and Muller (1995). We assume that c2 = 0, in order to focus on the impact of c1. The parameter 
settings are summarized in Table 2. The discount factor is δ  = 1/1.08 = 0.926, and si = ui. Even though ui 
is set to 0 (for convenience, and without loss of generality since ip  can be interpreted as profit margin 
instead of price) in our numerical computations, sampling is still expensive due to the lost revenue of the 
sampled product. In order to evaluate the value of dtdN /1  and dtdN /2 we use the Euler approximation 
with step size 1.1  
 
 
 
Table 2: Parameter Settings 
Parameter Segment 1 Segment 2 
Coefficient of Innovation (a) 0.005:0.03 0.03 
Coefficient of Imitation (b) 0.002 0.0018 
Coefficient of Inter-product 
  Interaction (c) 
0:-0.002 0 
Market Potential (m) 100 100 
Price (p) 1 1 
Unit Cost (u) 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Even though more sophisticated numerical techniques are available, they do not change the 
qualitative nature of our results. Some representative calculations in the parameter range of 
interest show that a 90% reduction in step size lead to less than 1.75% change in undiscounted 
revenue. 
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Table 3: Optimal Sampling levels 
 
c1 Parameters 
0 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0015 -0.002
0.005 6 11 16 26 0 
0.006 6 10 16 25 0 
0.007 5 10 15 24 0 
0.00766 5 9 15 24 0 
0.00767 5 9 15 24 21 
0.008 5 9 15 24 21 
0.009 4 9 14 23 21 
0.01 4 8 14 22 21 
0.015 1 6 11 19 19 
0.02 0 3 8 16 17 
0.025 0 1 6 13 15 
 
 
 
 
 
a1 
0.03 0 0 3 10 14 
 
Table 3 provides the results for the optimal sampling level for various values of a1 and c1. For any 
coefficient of innovation (a1), we observe that the optimal number of samples initially increases as c1 
becomes more negative. This is because more samples are needed in order for the diffusion trajectory to 
cross the separatrix in Figure 2. However, if the impeding influence of segment 2 is very strong and the 
coefficient of innovation for segment 1 is very low, sampling becomes prohibitively expensive and the 
optimal number of samples can drop to zero (for example, see top row of Table 3).  
For c1 = 0, we find that the optimal sampling levels decrease with the coefficient of innovation, as 
reported in Jain, Mahajan and Muller (1995). However, for highly negative values of c1 shown in the far 
right column of Table 3, optimal sampling levels may initially be zero, when the coefficient of innovation 
is low, then jump quite markedly to a high level beyond a threshold value for the coefficient of 
innovation, and finally decline again as the coefficient of innovation increases further. This occurs 
because, initially (for low values of a1, and highly negative values of c1), a large number of free samples 
may be needed in order to change the equilibrium outcomes. As a result, it may be prohibitively 
expensive to use seeding to attain market potential for both products. Hence, it may be suboptimal to seed 
the product in segment 1. However, beyond a certain threshold value for a1, we find that it is once again 
profitable to provide free samples targeted at consumers in segment 1. In summary, unlike the findings 
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reported in Jain, Mahajan and Muller (1995) in the single product case and Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo 
(2006) in the (+/0) case, optimal samples need not always decrease with the coefficient of innovation in 
settings with negative interaction. 
Next, we investigate the impact of the coefficient of imitation (b1) on the optimal number of samples. 
The parameters for the simulation are in Table 4 and the results are in Table 5. For a given value of the 
coefficient of imitation, the optimal number of samples initially increases as c1 becomes more negative. 
However, if the negative influence from segment 2 is strong and the word-of-mouth (WOM) effect within 
segment 1 is weak, then sampling is undesirable. This observation is consistent with the results in Table 3 
also. For c1 = 0, the optimal sampling level is non-decreasing with the coefficient of imitation, as reported 
by Jain, Mahajan and Muller (1995). This is because the initial samples help seed the market and WOM 
then helps speed the diffusion. However, the optimal number of samples is decreasing in the coefficient of 
imitation when there is an impeding influence from segment 2. When WOM effects are weak and the 
coefficient of inter-segment interaction is negative and significant, a large number of samples are needed 
to overcome the negative influence from segment 2. For example, the number of samples needed to cross 
the separatrix in Figure 2 can be very high when c1 is highly negative but b1 is small. However, when 
WOM effects are strong, the negative inter-segment interaction is less relevant once the installed base 
attains a certain level of market penetration. Thus, the firm no longer needs a large sampling level. Unlike 
the results reported by Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo (2006) for the (+/0) case, we find that the optimal 
level of sampling may be decreasing smoothly, or show abrupt upward jump points followed by smooth 
declines, as the coefficient of imitation increases. 
Table 4: Parameter Setting 
Parameter Product 1 Product 2 
Coefficient of Innovation (a) 0.02 0.03 
Coefficient of Imitation (b) 0.001: 0.005 0.002 
Coefficient of Inter-product 
  Interaction (c) 
0:-0.002 0 
Market Potential (m) 100 100 
Price (p) 1 1 
Unit Cost (u) 0 0 
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Table 5: Optimal Sampling levels 
c1 Parameters 
0 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0015 -0.002
0.001 0 7 0 0 0 
0.0015 0 4 15 0 0 
0.002 0 3 9 17 17 
0.0025 0 3 6 10 16 
0.003 1 3 5 8 11 
0.0035 1 3 4 6 8 
0.004 2 3 4 5 6 
0.0045 2 3 4 4 5 
 
 
 
 
b1 
0.005 2 3 3 4 5 
 
 
In summary, a very important potential role of sampling under negative inter-segment interaction is 
that of modifying the long term equilibrium. As a result, the optimal level of sampling can be much 
higher with inter-segment interaction, than when diffusion is analyzed in a homogeneous consumer 
population.  For example, Jain, Mahajan and Muller (1995) report that the maximum sampling level 
observed in their analysis was never higher than 9%. However, for similar parameters, we find that the 
maximum sampling levels in the presence of strong inter-segment interaction can exceed 20%. This is 
because the role of sampling is not only to encourage early adoption when innovation is low or when 
imitation is high, but also to mitigate any negative influence from the other segment.  
 
3.3.2. Demand Control 
In Section 3.2 we showed that when LHR1 is negative, the only stable equilibrium outcome is (0, m2). 
In such cases, seeding will not be helpful in achieving (m1, m2) as a stable outcome. An alternative 
strategy available to a marketing manager is to limit the diffusion ceiling for the segment exerting the 
negative influence (i.e., to restrict m2 to 2m′  , where 2m′  < m2 in order to make (m1, 2m′ ) a stable 
equilibrium outcome). Such a strategy can be implemented in many ways, including limiting the 
distribution of the product to select channels rarely patronized by the impeding segment. For instance, 
Diesel and Burberry have limited the effective access of their products to “wannabes” by setting a high 
enough price and restricting distribution to certain exclusive channels. Offering limited editions is another 
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way to control the availability of the product to the impeding segment, as noted by Amaldoss and Jain 
(2008). 
We provide a numerical illustration. Table 6 lists the parameter values for the two segments. The 
discount factor is set to δ = 0.926.  Table 7 reports the results. Segment 2 exerts a negative influence on 
segment 1. In the absence of any intervention, the only stable equilibrium is (0,100). Reducing the market 
potential for segment 2 from 100 to 50 increases the total discounted profit by 22.1% (from 54.42 to 
66.46). The new equilibrium is (100,50) and thus the consumers in segment 1 do not disadopt the product 
in the long run.  
 
Table 6: Parameter Settings 
Parameter Segment 1 Segment 2 
Coefficient of Innovation (a) 0.02 0.03 
Coefficient of Imitation (b) 0.003 0.001 
Coefficient of Inter-Product 
  Interaction (c) 
-0.002 0.002 
Market Potential (m) 100 100 
Price (p) 1 1 
Unit Cost (u) 0 0 
 
Table 7: Results for Reduced Market Potential 
 Base 
Case 
Demand
Control 
Market Potential (m2) 100 50 
Is (m1, m2) stable? No Yes 
Profit 54.42 66.46 
 
 
 
4. Mutually Impeding Influence Model (-/-) 
We now turn to the case in which 0,0 21 << cc . For example, cellular service providers often 
observe such negative interaction between the mainstream and youth segments (Maier 2003). If the brand 
is primarily perceived as one for teenagers, it draws many of the mainstream customers, especially 
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business customers, away from the service. Similarly, increased adoption by business users impedes its 
diffusion among the teenager segment.  
In the analysis that follows, we identify conditions under which the two segments (or products) can 
achieve their market potential despite the negative interaction. Intervention strategies like seeding and 
demand control are still relevant in the context of this model, though there are some differences from the 
Asymmetric Influence Model. For example, an additional decision that has to be made is whether to seed 
both segments (products) or only one, and—in the latter case—which of the two to seed. 
As before, we first identify the isoclines, or curves along which 0'1 =N  or 0'2 =N . Using the 
condition 01 =′N  and equations (1a) and (1b), we obtain the isoclines of N1 as 11 mN =  and 
||/)( 11112 cNbaN += . Similarly, the isoclines for N2 are 22 mN =  and ||/)( 22221 cNbaN += . 
The latter equation can be rewritten as 22212 /)||( bacNN −= . We refer to the isocline 
||/)( 11112 cNbaN +=  as I1 and the isocline 22212 /)||( bacNN −=  as I2.  
The isoclines 11 mN =  and 22 mN =  intersect at ( 21 , mm ). We denote this singular point as A. The 
isoclines 22 mN =  and I1 intersect at ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,
)||( m
b
acm , a singular point which we label B and which 
lies in the feasible region if 0<
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m , a singular point which we label C and which lies in the feasible region if 0< 
2
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b
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< 2m . Finally, the isoclines I1 and I2 intersect at point D which has the coordinates 
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Based on whether or not B, C and D lie within the feasible region, one obtains six possible cases. We 
describe two of those cases below in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. The scenario described in Section 4.1 is the 
only case in which the product can stably attain its market potential in both segments, while the scenario 
in Section 4.2 is fairly representative of the kind of results obtained for the remaining four cases described 
in complete detail in Appendix A. 
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4.1. Mild Mutually Impeding Influence (Positive LHR1 and Positive LHR2) 
When LHR1 and LHR2 are both positive (i.e., 0<
1
112 )||(
b
acm −
< m1 and 0<
2
221 )||(
b
acm −
< 2m ), both 
B and C lie within the feasible region. When these conditions are satisfied, it can be verified that the two 
isoclines I1 and I2 cannot intersect in the feasible region, implying that singular point D lies outside the 
feasible region and is therefore, irrelevant to our analysis (see Figure 4).   
There exist three singular points in the feasible region: ( 21 , mm ), ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,
)||(
m
b
acm  and 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
221
1
)||(
,
b
acm
m  denoted by A, B and C respectively in Figure 4. Trajectories passing through points 
above isocline I1 always move up and to the left until they converge to (0, m2). Similarly, trajectories 
passing through points below I2 move down and to the right until they converge to the boundary point 
(m1, 0). Trajectories in the region between isoclines I1 and I2 move up and to the right. Thus, trajectories 
close to singular point A will eventually converge to ( 21 , mm ). Proposition 3 formalizes these 
observations. 
Figure 4.  Phase Diagram for Mild Mutually Impeding Influence 
 
 
 (0, m2) 
(m1, 0) 
A
C
N1 = m1 
N2 = m2 
1 2 1 1 1 1: ( ) / | |I N a b N c= +
2 2 1 2 2 2: ( | | ) /I N N c a b= −
B
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Proposition 3: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with positive values for LHR1 and LHR2, the 
only stable equilibrium outcomes possible are )0,(),,0( 12 mm  and ),( 21 mm .  
Proof: See Appendix B. 
In Lemma 1 of Appendix B we show that points B and C are saddle points. Therefore there exist two 
corresponding separatrices that demarcate the phase plane into three non-overlapping regions. All 
trajectories belonging to a region will converge to the same equilibrium outcome. In Figure 5, we plot 
separatrices and sample trajectories for the system:  
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       (7) 
Figure 5. Phase Diagram with Separatrices for (7) 
 
 The separatrices are easy to compute numerically, as explained in Appendix C. Once the 
separatrices are identified, a manager can assess the need for various intervention strategies based on the 
long-term equilibrium associated with any given starting point. Interestingly, observe in Figure 5 that the 
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region wherein trajectories converge to ),( 21 mm  is very narrow initially. Even if the marketer can seed 
the market to ensure that the diffusion begins in this region, small shocks in the environment can 
potentially push the trajectory into one of the two surrounding regions. Thus, it can be rare for both 
segments (products) to reach their market potential. Considerable care will be needed during the early 
phases of product diffusion to ensure that the diffusion trajectory stays in the desirable region.  
 
4.2. Strong Mutually Negative Influence (Negative LHR1 and Negative LHR2) 
In this case, isocline I1 intersects 22 mN =  outside the feasible region. Similarly, isocline I2 
intersects 11 mN =  outside the feasible region. This implies that the two isoclines I1 and I2 necessarily 
intersect in the feasible region as shown in Figure 6. Singular point D will then lie in the feasible region. 
Thus, we get two singular points ( 21 , mm ) and ⎟⎟⎠
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respectively in Figure 6. If we consider the non-negativity constraints, then (m1, 0) and (0, m2) behave like 
additional sinks. The stable equilibrium points are identified below. 
Proposition 4: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with negative values for LHR1 and LHR2, the 
only stable equilibrium outcomes possible are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm .  
Proof: See Appendix B. 
A significant implication is that the two segments (products) cannot co-exist in equilibrium in this 
case. 
A summary of the stable equilibrium outcomes for all possible cases in the Mutually Impeding 
Influence model is provided in Table 8. Both segments can co-exist in equilibrium only when the 
impeding influences from the other customer segment are mild, i.e., if 0<
1
112 )||(
b
acm − <m1 and 
0<
2
221 )||(
b
acm − < 2m . Otherwise, adoption in only one segment will eventually reach its market potential 
and adoption in the other segment will fade away. Further, even in the case in which ( 21 , mm ) is stable, 
the region in which trajectories converge to ( 21 , mm ) can be narrow early on. Thus, it can be very 
challenging to achieve full market potential for both segments (products) under mutually impeding 
diffusion. 
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Figure 6. Phase Diagram for Strong Mutually Impeding 
Influence
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Summary of equilibrium outcomes and their stability properties: 
Mutually Impeding Influence Model 
 
 Scenario Candidate Equilibrium Outcomes 
Section LHR1 LHR2 D feasible? (m1, m2) B C D (0, m2) (m1, 0)
4.1 +ve +ve - Stable Unstable Unstable - Stable Stable 
A.1 -ve +ve Yes Unstable - Unstable Unstable Stable Stable 
A.2 -ve +ve No Unstable - Unstable - Stable Stable 
A.3 +ve -ve Yes Unstable Unstable - Unstable Stable Stable 
A.4 +ve -ve No Unstable Unstable - - Stable Stable 
4.2 -ve -ve Yes Unstable - - Unstable Stable Stable 
Note: Sections A.1 through A.4 can be found in Appendix A 
A
D 
N1 = m1 
N2 = m2 
22212 /)||( bacNN −=
 (0, m2) 
(m1, 0) 
||/)( 11112 cNbaN +=
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Due to this difficulty, firms may choose to disassociate or decouple the two segments or products 
even if it imposes additional costs (see also Amaldoss and Jain 2008). This is typically achieved by 
targeting each segment with distinct product versions or even distinct brands. For example, Nextel (now 
merged with Sprint) responded to the negative interaction between the teenager and mainstream segments 
by marketing to teenagers through a new brand. Nextel partnered with Boost, a firm that operated in 
Australia and was relatively unknown in the US at that time. “Most Boost subscribers in America likely 
don't realize that their calls are carried by Nextel … and a company whose brand name, by its own 
admission, is a total loser with the young,” (Maier 2003). Another way to decouple segments is simply to 
reduce the visibility of the product. For instance, in trying to reduce the appeal of the Burberry brand 
among British hooligans, the firm started to make its distinctive and iconic tartan check pattern much less 
prominent on its apparel and accessories.  
 
5. Symbiotic Influence Model (+/+) 
The case of symbiotic influence is equally applicable to the context of two customer segments or two 
products. The discussion here is in the context of two complementary products. Several products are 
known to have positive influence on each other. For example, consumers are more likely to adopt cellular 
data services when more content is available on the platform. Simultaneously, content developers are 
more likely to develop content for the platform when there are a large number of consumers using it. 
Similar two-sided network effects are commonly observed in a number of information markets such as 
those tied to technology platforms. When products have positive interaction (i.e., 0,0 21 ≥≥ cc ), the 
hazard rate is always positive. Thus, both products will reach their market potential in equilibrium. 
Nonetheless, marketing managers face unique issues raised by the inter-product interactions. For 
example, what is the fastest or most profitable way to reach the equilibrium ( 21, mm )? In the asymmetric 
influence model in Section 3 we discussed seeding as a strategy to help achieve (m1, m2) as a stable 
equilibrium outcome. In the symbiotic influence model, (m1, m2) is the only singular point and it is a 
stable equilibrium outcome. Nonetheless, seeding can help speed the diffusion process towards (m1, m2). 
Seeding a product not only helps speed its own diffusion but also contributes to faster diffusion of the 
other product. Hence, the analysis of optimal sampling is very relevant, the main idea being quite similar 
to that of focusing one’s marketing efforts on customers with more than average social influence to gain 
maximum leverage. Due to space constraints, we do not delve into the details. 
 
 
 
 28
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have studied the diffusion of a product in two customer segments where the acceptance level in 
one segment affects the diffusion rate not only in that same segment, but also in the other. In doing so, we 
have focused on the cases of asymmetric (+/-) and mutually impeding (-/-) influence. Both types of cross-
segment interaction are quite important for products and brands that act as social signifiers, and have 
become of considerable interest to both consumer researchers and marketing scientists (e.g., Amaldoss 
and Jain 2008; Berger and Heath 2007, 2008; Joshi et al. 2006). The analytical approach we use and our 
key results apply also to the diffusion of two interacting products in a single population, a more 
established area of research where analytical results have been hard to obtain (Bayus et al. 2000). Since 
the diffusion system we study does not have a closed-form solution, we use phase plane analysis to 
determine equilibrium points of the joint diffusion process and characterize their stability properties.  
A rather surprising result is that, even in situations with symmetric or asymmetric negative influence, 
stable equilibrium outcomes do not include partial penetration. In other words, in a stable equilibrium, 
each segment has adopted either entirely or not at all. This strong result, however, is likely to hinge on the 
assumption that disadoption is possible. If this were not so, then trajectories in the phase plane would 
likely “freeze” at a particular level of, say, N1, without reverting back to the origin and settling at (0,m2).  
An important practical contribution consists in using separatrices to identify, for each possible 
combination of acceptance level in each segment (or, in a two-product setting, for each level of installed 
base of each product) which particular equilibrium point the diffusion trajectory will converge to. 
Importantly, we find at most three such regions with different convergence behavior in all of our analyses, 
making it easy to make such inferences. For the cases of asymmetric influence (+/-) and mutually 
impeding influence (-/-) of central interest, we also identify the conditions under which both products can 
achieve full market potential in equilibrium. Our results indicate that considerable care is needed in the 
early stages of product launch. For instance, we analyzed a setting with mild mutually negative influence 
across segments that may easily induce a false sense of complacency. While the odds of reaching full 
penetration in both segments ( 21 , mm ) might seem high intuitively, a closer analysis (as in Figure 5) 
reveals that the “funnel” of trajectories that eventually end up at ( 21 , mm ) can be very narrow early on in 
the lifecycle of a product. Such early bifurcation-like behavior in the model may explain why predicting 
market success is especially difficult for products with strong iconic and social identity appeal (Farrell 
1998; Lieberson 2000).  
We find that for many realistic parameter combinations, full penetration in both segments will not be 
achieved without specific intervention. So, our results provide an explanation for several marketing 
practices for new products appealing to segments between which asymmetric or mutually impeding 
influence operates: (1) “seeding,” i.e., using free samples to support the launch of a product in one 
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segment being harmed by the adoption in the other, (2) “demand control,” i.e., purposely limiting market 
potential for the customer segment harming product diffusion in the other segment by making the product 
more selective or by launching targeted limited editions, and (3) “decoupling,” i.e., purposely decreasing 
the amount of (negative) cross-segment influence, typically achieved by targeting distinct offerings to 
different segments (versioning) or by decreasing the visibility of the product.  
We provide managerial insights into the effectiveness of seeding and demand control in the context of 
asymmetric (+/-) interaction. The key novel finding about seeding is that, unlike cases without negative 
cross-segment interaction studied previously, the optimal level of sampling may show abrupt jumps 
followed by smooth declines as the coefficients of innovation and imitation increase. A simple numerical 
analysis on the effectiveness of demand control confirms that, in situations with asymmetric influence, 
“less can be more”, hence validating common practices among marketers of brands with strong social 
identity value. 
Separatrix analysis can be quite valuable to firms as it allows managers to identify whether or not the 
diffusion process will evolve to full penetration in both segments without special managerial intervention. 
These separatrices can be numerically computed for any system, as described in detail in Appendix C. 
MATLAB code is available (e.g., Polking and Arnold 2003; http://math.rice.edu/~polking/odesoft/), and 
the algorithm for computing the separatrix can also be implemented in a spreadsheet. An Excel 
implementation for the scenario described in section 3.1 is available. 
The presence of symmetric and asymmetric negative cross-segment and positive cross-product 
interactions can have a critical impact on diffusion outcomes and can significantly affect the effectiveness 
of particular marketing actions. Yet, much research remains to be done.  
As already mentioned, the result that any stable equilibrium has each segment either fully adopted or 
not at all, need not hold when disadoption is not possible. This raises the managerially interesting 
question whether policies allowing for disadoption (such as leasing rather than selling equipment) may, in 
some cases not lead to more desirable equilibrium diffusion outcomes.  
Other model variations could be analyzed. For instance, we analyzed situations where cross-segment 
or cross-product interactions operate through the diffusion rate rather than through the market potential. If 
one were interested specifically in substitution effects across products rather than in cross-segment 
dynamics, then having the effect operate via the market potential might be intuitively more appealing, and 
it is not clear to what extent this would lead to results different from the ones presented here. For instance, 
the asymmetric influence (+/-) specification of such a model would be similar—though not identical—to 
the standard Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model which can produce cyclical patterns. 
Given our finding that prior results on optimal seeding may not be applicable when significant inter-
product/inter-segment interactions exist, it may be useful to investigate how pricing and advertising 
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strategies are affected by such interactions. Such research on how firms can effectively balance social 
forces of distinction and emulation across segments could prove a valuable complement to recent game-
theoretic research on the same question that does not explicitly focus on diffusion trajectories. 
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Appendix A: Four Remaining Cases: Mutually Impeding Influence Model 
A.1.  Negative LHR1 and Positive LHR2; D within feasible region. 
In this case there are three singular points - ( 21 , mm ), ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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baac  in the feasible region. These are labeled A, C and D respectively 
in Figure A1. Trajectories passing through points above both isoclines I1 and I2 move up and to the left 
until they converge to (0, m2). Similarly, trajectories passing through points below both I1 and I2 move 
down and to the right until they converge to the boundary point (m1, 0). Trajectories in the remaining two 
regions cross over into one of the two regions described above (see Figure A1). The equilibrium 
outcomes can be characterized as follows: 
Proposition 5: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with a negative value for LHR1, but positive 
LHR2, and D lying within the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes 
are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm . 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Thus, in this system, both products cannot exist in equilibrium.  
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Figure A1. Phase Diagram with A, C and D as singular points 
(Mutually Impeding Influence) 
 
 
A.2.  Negative LHR1 and Positive LHR2; D outside feasible region. 
We now consider the case in which there are two singular points - ( 21 , mm ) and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
221
1
)||(
,
b
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m  in 
the feasible region. These are labeled A and C respectively in Figure A2.  The intersection of isclines I1 
and I2 (point D) lies outside the feasible region.  
 Trajectories passing through points above isocline I1 move up and to the left until the converge to 
(0, m2). Similarly, trajectories passing through points below I2 move down and to the right until they 
converge to the boundary point (m1, 0). The equilibrium outcomes can be characterized as follows: 
Proposition 6: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with a negative value for LHR1, but positive 
LHR2, and D lying outside the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes possible 
are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm . 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Thus, in this system, both products cannot exist in equilibrium.  
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Figure A2. Phase Diagram with A and C as singular points  
(Mutually Impeding Influence) 
 
 
A.3.  Positive LHR1 and Negative LHR2; D in feasible region. 
In this case we get three singular points - ( 21 , mm ), ⎟⎟⎠
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Thus, the equilibrium outcomes can be characterized as follows: 
Proposition 7: Under mutually negative interaction between products (i.e. c1<0, c2<0) with negative 
LHR1 and positive LHR2 and D lying within the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes 
possible are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm . 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 Thus, in this case as well, both products cannot co-exist in equilibrium. 
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Figure A3. Phase Diagram with A, B and D as singular points 
(Mutually Impeding Influence) 
 
 
 
A.4.  Positive LHR1 and Negative LHR2; D outside feasible region. 
In this case we get two singular points - ( 21 , mm ) and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,)||( m
b
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. These are labeled A, and B 
respectively in Figure A4. The equilibrium outcomes can be characterized as follows: 
Proposition 8: Under mutually negative interaction between products (i.e. c1<0, c2<0), with negative 
LHR1 and positive LHR2 and D lying outside the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes 
possible are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm . 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 Thus, in this case as well, both products cannot co-exist in equilibrium. 
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Figure A4. Phase Diagram with A and B as singular points 
(Mutually Impeding Influence) 
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Appendix B: Proofs 
Lemma 1: For the dynamical systems described in (1a) and (1b), stability analyses of the singular points 
yield the following: 
(i) Point A, or ( 21 , mm ), is a singular point for any set of values of the diffusion parameters. It is 
stable if and only if both LHR1 and LHR2 are positive, and LHR1 ≠ LHR2. 
(ii) Point B, or  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +− 2
1
121 , m
b
cma  with 01 <c ,  is a singular point if and only if LHR1 is 
positive. Furthermore, it is a saddle point, whenever it qualifies as a singular point. 
(iii) Point C, or ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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2
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1 , b
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m  with 02 <c , is a singular point if and only if LHR2 is positive. 
Furthermore, it is a saddle point, whenever it qualifies as a singular point. 
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point whenever it is within the feasible region (i.e.,0< ⎟⎟⎠
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a < 2m ). Furthermore, it is a saddle point, whenever it qualifies as 
a singular point. 
 
Proof: 
The system of equations (1a) and (1b) can be represented as: 
0;0
),(
),(
21
21
2
21
1
≥≥
=
=
NN
NNg
dt
dN
NNf
dt
dN
 
In order to study the stability properties of the singular points of this non-linear system of equations, we 
will have to linearize it in the region around the singular point. Then we can use standard techniques to 
analyze the stability of singularities in linear systems. We do this as follows. Since f and g are twice 
continuously differentiable, we can expand them in a Taylor polynomial around the singular point 
( 02
0
1 , NN ): 
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where P( 022011 , NNNN −−  ) and Q( 022011 , NNNN −−  ) are functions that comprise terms that are at least 
quadratic, or higher order, in the arguments ( 011 NN − ) and ( 022 NN −  ). Near the singular point, these terms 
will be negligibly small compared to the linear terms, and hence we can study the behavior of the non-
linear system near its singular points, by making the following change of coordinates: 
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The standard form of a linear system of differential equations is dx/dt = Ax, for vector x. Then  
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Next, we compute the eigenvalues of the matrix A by solving Det(A-λI)=0. This gives us the quadratic 
equation: 
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Let the eigenvalues corresponding to a singular point be denoted by 1λ  and 2λ . A singular point is a 
saddle point if the eigenvalues are of opposite sign. The singular point is a sink if the eigenvalues are 
distinct and negative (Hubbard and West 1995). We now determine the eigenvalues associated with each 
of the 4 identified singular points. 
i) Stability analysis of A, or ( 21 , mm ): 
Solving the quadratic equation at ),(),( 21
0
2
0
1 mmNN = , we get the following eigenvalues: 
2122222
1211111
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Under the conditions 1
1
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b
acm <−<  and 2
2
2120 m
b
amc <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −<  ,  which are also implied by 
a positive value for LHR1 and LHR2, we can easily see both eigenvalues are strictly negative, and if we 
assume them to be distinct then we can conclude that ( 21 , mm ) is a sink. (Equal eigenvalues imply a 
degenerate node.) At the same time, when either LHR1 or LHR2 is negative (at least one eigenvalue is 
positive) then ( 21 , mm ) is a saddle point. 
ii) Stability analysis of B, or ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +− 2
1
121 , m
b
cma : 
When 01 >c , this singular point does not lie in the feasible region and is thus not relevant. We therefore 
focus on the case in which 01 <c . The singular point can be rewritten as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,)||( m
b
acm . 
After solving the quadratic equation, the eigenvalues are: 
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Under the condition 1
1
112 ||0 m
b
acm <−<  (i.e., singular point B is in the feasible region), we can clearly 
see that 12 0 λλ << .  The condition for B to lie in the feasible region is also implied by a positive LHR1. 
Hence, the singular point, if it exists in the feasible region, is always a saddle point. 
iii) Stability analysis of C, or ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
2
122
1 , b
mca
m  
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When 02 >c , this singular point does not lie in the feasible region and is thus not relevant. We therefore 
focus on the case in which 02 <c . The singular point can be rewritten as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
212
1
||
,
b
amc
m . Solving the 
quadratic equation, the eigenvalues corresponding to this singular point are: 
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Under the condition 2
2
221 ||0 m
b
acm <−<  (i.e., singular point C is in the feasible region), we can 
clearly see that 12 0 λλ << .  The condition for C to lie in the feasible region is also implied by a positive 
LHR2. Hence, the singular point C, if it exists in the feasible region, is always a saddle point. 
iv) Stability analysis of D, or ⎟⎟⎠
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For this singular point to take on positive coordinate values we necessarily require that 
0|||| 2121 >− bbcc .  The quadratic equation that is to be solved to determine the eigenvalues, takes on the 
form: 
0))()(()]()([ 022
0
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0
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2 =−−−+−+−− NmNmccbbNmbNmbλλ  
We observe that the coefficient of 2λ  is 1 and the independent term in the equation is negative. The 
basics of the theory of quadratic equations then imply that the eigenvalues (or roots of the quadratic 
equation) are real and of opposite sign. Hence, this singular point is a saddle point. QED. 
 
Lemma 2: For the asymmetric influence model, if ( ) 21111 || mabmc +< , then ( 21 , mm ) is a stable 
equilibrium point (a sink) and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,
)||( m
b
acm
 is an unstable equilibrium point (a saddle point) for 
the dynamic system represented by (1a) and (1b). 
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1-(i) and Lemma 1-(ii). QED. 
 
Lemma 3: For asymmetric interaction between the segments (i.e., 0,0 21 ≥< cc ), if 
( ) 21111 || mabmc +< , then ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −∈∞→ ),
)||(
(),,0(),,())(),((lim 2
1
112
22121 mb
acmmmmtNtN
t
. Further, 
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because ( )21112 ,/)||( mbacm −  is a saddle point, the only stable equilibrium outcomes are ),0( 2m  and 
( 21 , mm ). 
Proof: At ),0( 2m , and in its vicinity, the sign of dtdN /1  is negative and that of dtdN /2  is positive. As 
a result, a slight perturbation in location from ),0( 2m to a nearby location in within the feasible region on 
the phase plane will result in the trajectory returning to ),0( 2m . So even though ),0( 2m is not a singular 
point, the constraints N1 ≥ 0 and N2 ≤ m2, ensure that it behaves like one. All trajectories in the 
neighborhood of ),0( 2m  will converge to it in the limit as ∞→t . This observation, along with Lemma 
2 proves the result. QED. 
 
Proposition 1: For the Asymmetric Influence model with a positive value for LHR1, the only stable 
equilibrium outcomes possible are ),0( 2m  and ( 21 , mm ). 
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. QED. 
Here, and in the subsequent analyses, we don’t go into the details of the degenerate boundary case, i.e., 
when 
1
1
112 )||( m
b
acm =− . This is because it leads to a zero eigenvalue at the singular point ( 21 , mm ). This 
is a degenerate case because it results in a line of equilibria. With the slightest perturbation, this whole 
line of equilibria disappears, and new equilibrium points are obtained (Hubbard and West 1995). 
 
Lemma 4: For asymmetric influence between the segments or products (i.e., 0,0 21 ≥< cc ), if 
( ) 21111 || mabmc +> , then ( 21 , mm ) is a saddle point for the system represented by (1a) and (1b). 
Proof:  Follows from Lemma 1-(i). QED. 
 
Lemma 5: For asymmetric influence between the segments or products (i.e., 0,0 21 ≥< cc ), if 
( ) 21111 || mabmc +>  , then { }),0(),,())(),((lim 22121 mmmtNtNt ∈∞→ . Further, because ),( 21 mm  is a 
saddle point, the only stable equilibrium outcome is ),0( 2m . 
Proof: All trajectories in neighborhood of ),0( 2m  will converge to it in the limit as ∞→t , by a 
reasoning similar to the one presented in the proof of Lemma 3. This observation, along with Lemma 4, 
proves the result. QED. 
 
Proposition 2: For the Asymmetric Influence model with a negative value for LHR1, the only stable 
equilibrium outcome possible is ),0( 2m . 
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Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. QED. 
 
Lemma 6: For the case with mutually negative interaction between segments or products (i.e. c1<0, 
c2<0), if the conditions 0<
1
112 )||(
b
acm −
< m1 and 0< 
2
221 )||(
b
acm −
< 2m are satisfied, then ( 21 , mm ) is a 
sink while ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
1
112 ,)||( m
b
acm  and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
221
1
)||(,
b
acmm  are saddle points. 
Proof:  Follows from Lemma 1-(i), (ii) and (iii). 
 
Lemma 7: When there is mutually negative interaction between segments or products (i.e. c1<0, c2<0), 
and the conditions on parameters: 0<
1
112 )||(
b
acm − <m1 and 0<
2
221 )||(
b
acm − < 2m  are satisfied, then: 
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. 
Further, the only stable equilibrium outcomes are )0,(),,0( 12 mm  and ),( 21 mm . 
Proof: All trajectories in neighborhood of ),0( 2m  will converge to it in the limit as ∞→t , by a 
reasoning similar to the one presented in the proof of Lemma 3. Also all trajectories in neighborhood of 
)0,( 1m  will converge to it in the limit as ∞→t . This is because at )0,( 1m , and in its vicinity, the sign 
of dtdN /1  is positive and that of dtdN /2  is negative. Even though )0,( 1m is not a singular point, the 
constraints N1 ≤ m1 and N2 ≥ 0, ensure that it behaves like one. These observations along with Lemma 6 
prove the result. QED. 
 
Proposition 3: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with positive values for LHR1 and LHR2, the 
only stable equilibrium outcomes possible are )0,(),,0( 12 mm  and ),( 21 mm .  
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. QED. 
Lemma 8: If the conditions 
1
112 )||(
b
acm −
> m1 and 
2
221 )||(
b
acm −
> 2m  are satisfied, then ( 21 , mm ) and 
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c
b
c
a
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baac  are saddle points. 
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1 – (i) and (iv). QED. 
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Lemma 9: Under mutually negative interaction between products (i.e. c1<0, c2<0), if the conditions on 
diffusion parameters: 
1
112 )||(
b
acm − >m1 and 
2
221 )||(
b
acm − > 2m  are satisfied, then 
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. Further the only stable 
equilibrium outcomes are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm . 
Proof: Follows from Lemma 8 and the logic described in Lemma 7. QED. 
 
Proposition 4: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with negative values for LHR1 and LHR2, the 
only stable equilibrium outcomes possible are )0,(),,0( 12 mm .  
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. QED. 
 
Lemma 10: If the conditions 
1
112 )||(
b
acm −
> m1 and 0< 
2
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< 2m are satisfied, and D is in the 
feasible region (i.e., 0< ⎟⎟⎠
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Proof: Follows from Lemma 1 – (i), (iii) and (iv). QED. 
 
Lemma 11: For segments or products which exert a mutually negative influence on each other during the 
diffusion process (i.e. c1<0, c2<0), if 
1
112 )||(
b
acm − >m1 ; 0<
2
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Further the only stable equilibrium outcomes are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm . 
Proof: Follows from Lemma 10 and the logic described in Lemma 7. QED. 
 
Proposition 5: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with a negative value for LHR1, but positive 
LHR2, and D lying within the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes are )0,(),,0( 12 mm . 
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Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 10 and Lemma 11. QED. 
 
Proposition 6: For the Mutually Impeding Influence model with a negative value for LHR1, but positive 
LHR2, and D lying outside the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes possible 
are )0,(),,0( 12 mm . 
Proof: The proof is identical to that for Proposition 4, with segments 1 and 2 interchanged. 
 
Proposition 7: Under mutually negative interaction between products (i.e. c1<0, c2<0) with negative 
LHR1 and positive LHR2 and D lying within the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes 
possible are )0,(),,0( 12 mm . 
Proof: The proof is identical to that for Proposition 5, with products 1 and 2 interchanged. 
 
Lemma 12: If the conditions 
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Proof: Follows from Lemma 1-(i) and (ii). QED. 
 
Lemma 13: For segments or products which exert a mutually negative influence on each other during the 
diffusion process (i.e. c1<0, c2<0), if 
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Further the only stable equilibrium outcomes are )0,( and ),0( 12 mm . 
Proof: Follows from Lemma 12 and the logic described in Lemma 7. QED. 
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Proposition 8: Under mutually negative interaction between products (i.e. c1<0, c2<0), with negative 
LHR1 and positive LHR2 and D lying outside the feasible region, the only stable equilibrium outcomes 
possible are )0,(),,0( 12 mm . 
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 12 and 13. 
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Appendix C.  Numerical Computation of the Separatrix 
Exactly two 21NN  trajectories pass through a saddle point, which is an unstable singular point. The paths 
traced out by the incoming trajectories corresponding to the negative eigenvalues are the Separatrices for 
the dynamical system under study. Below, we outline an algorithm to plot the Separatrices associated 
with a given saddle point. We also illustrate the steps for the following dynamical system corresponding 
to the Asymmetric Influence Model described in Section 3.1: 
1
1 2 1
2
2 1 2
(0.02 0.002 0.001 )(100 )
(0.03 0.002 0.001 )(100 )
dN N N N
dt
dN N N N
dt
= + − −
= + + −
 
The complete implementation is in the attached spreadsheet. 
1. Calculate the eigenvalues associated with the saddle point, ( 02
0
1 , NN ), being analyzed, using the 
quadratic equation described in the proof of Lemma 1: 
0))(()2)(2(
])2()2([
0
22
0
1121
0
22
0
12222
0
11
0
21111
0
221
0
112222111
2
=−−−−−−−−−
++−+−−+−−
NmNmccNbNcambNbNcamb
NbcNbcambambλλ
 
For the above system, the saddle point is (40,100). The two eigenvalues are 0.12 and -0.27 and 
the corresponding eigenvectors are (1,0) and (0.1, 0.65).  
2. Identify a ‘starting point’ which is slightly displaced from the saddle point in the direction of the 
eigenvector corresponding to the negative eigenvalue. Recall that for a saddle point 21 0 λλ >> . 
For the above system, we identify a starting point which is slightly displaced from (40,100) in the 
direction (0.1, 0.65) while ensuring we are within the feasible region. This gives us the starting 
point (39.9,99.35) 
3. Using the discretized version of the system of equations described in (1a) and (1b), and the 
‘starting point’ identified in step 2, trace out the path ( 21NN  trajectory) obtained by moving in 
positive time, as well as that obtained by moving in negative time. For the former, the 
displacement of the starting point should be along the direction of the eigenvector obtained in 
step 2, while for the latter the displacement should be in the opposite direction. The path obtained 
is the Separatrix of interest. 
The accompanying spreadsheet demonstrates the detailed implementation of these steps for the above 
dynamical system. MATLAB code is available as well (e.g., Polking and Arnold 2003; 
http://math.rice.edu/~polking/odesoft/). 
